Informationsspridning i Afghanistan, lokalt och nationellt

Material att använda vid överklagan eller verkställighetshinder (VUT). Sammanställt augusti 2018 av Lisa Carlgren, Göteborg (organisationsforskare, frivillig familjehemsförälder). I syfte att stötta afghanska ungdomar som fått avslag med hänvisning till att de kan leva i en annan del av landet, samt de som inte längre är muslimer.

Se också Kan man gömma sig i Afghanistan? 

Lifos Temarapport Afghanistan, Kristna och Apostater 2017-12-21, om apostasi och hur information sprids.

https://lifos.migrationsverket.se/dokument?documentSummaryId=40679

Denna rapport, Kapitel 9 om informationsspridning i Afghanistan (generell information om hur information sprids i nätverk och inom Talibanrörelsen lokalt och nationellt). Rapporten handlar om apostasi, konvertering osv, men denna del är generell och borde gälla för alla som hotas personligen av Talibaner.

”Afghanska lokalsamhällen är nära sammansvetsade, vilket innebär att afghaner, generellt sett, vet vad som händer i deras distrikt och när en ny person kommer till hemområdet eller passerar igenom det. Information kan också spridas långväga genom de sociala nätverken. Talibanrörelsen synar individer som är nykomlingar i områden under deras kontroll för att avgöra om de är myndighetsinformatörer. De synar också individer som reser mellan taliban- respektive regeringskontrollerade områden. Rörelsen har också ett nätverk av informatörer som arbetar med underrättelser i städerna. Den digitala tidsåldern har också medfört att de afghanska sociala nätverken alltmer brett ut sig i sociala medier, vilket idag också möjliggör för talibanrörelsen att följa personer online” (sid 23)

Not: stycket visar på hur svårt det kan vara att hålla sig undan Talibaner oavsett var man befinner sig i landet.

“Det finns många lokala konflikter i det afghanska samhället. Dessa konflikter medför ibland att man sprider illvilliga rykten som ett sätt att komma åt sin fiende. I konvertitfallet med Abdul Rahman 2006 så kom hans konversion upp till ytan och blev känd för myndigheterna på grund av en vårdnadstvist, då han angavs av familjemedlemmar […]

I fall där endast den nära familjen har kunskap om att en familjemedlem konverterat (oaktat om konversionen är genuin eller icke) kan det dock finnas ett intresse av att hemlighålla detta om familjen vill skydda personen. Det är dock individuellt hur olika familjer reagerar på en konversion som företagits av en av dess medlemmar”. (sid 23)

Not: stycket visar på hur information generellt kan spridas om familjen är illvillig, inte bara kopplat till konversion.

“Däremot finns det hos talibanrörelsen ett intresse av att bedriva underrättelseverksamhet avseende individer på afghansk mark i syfte att identifiera potentiella fiender. När det gäller afghaner som återvänder från utlandet samt från regeringskontrollerat område till en hemort belägen i ett talibankontrollerat eller starkt taliban-influerat område så är det därför troligt att sådana individer synas av talibanrörelsen. Vid denna process är det möjligt att de utöver sina fysiska nätverk och sin muntliga information också kan försöka efterforska information som finns på internet, exempelvis i sociala medier. Lifos betonar dock här att det är svårt att veta hur talibanrörelsens exakta metoder för inhämtning av underrättelser går till”. (sid 24)

EASO Country of Origin Information Report Afghanistan Individuals targeted by armed actors in the conflict. December 2017

Report from the European Asylum Support Office, EU.

https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/coi-Afghanistan-targeting-conflict.pdf

Taliban objectives:

”Targets of deliberate killings or abduction by insurgents in 2016 include, according to UNAMA, tribal elders, judicial staff, civilian government administration staff and civilians alleged to be government spies, but also civilians who refused to comply with insurgent instructions. In 2017, UNAMA added to this list ‘civilians perceived to oppose Anti-Government Element values’. Dr. Antonio Giustozzi summarised the targets of the Taliban as individuals the Taliban considers to be ‘misbehaving’. These include many of the individuals listed by UNAMA above and in addition, Giustozzi adds ‘individuals of any category selected by the Taliban as useful or necessary to their war effort, and who have refused to collaborate’. For example, the Taliban are known to have cut off the fingers of people participating in the elections of 2014 and targeted staff of the Independent Election Commission. According to scholar Neamat Nojumi, the targeting by the Taliban goes beyond those working for the Afghan government. One’s adherence to the Afghan Constitution or a liberal social or cultural view can also make a person a legitimate target. He explained that this is why the Taliban target those who participate in the elections or promote women’s rights.” (page 28)

Capacity [of the Taliban] to track and target individuals within larger cities

”the Taliban have a network of informants and conduct intelligence gathering in the cities, although it is more difficult to track people in urban areas. Targeted attacks in urban centre do occur. Some recent examples of targeting in Kabul include gunmen on motorcycles and remote controlled IEDs. […] In Kabul, there are at least 1,500 spies and informers of the Taliban, according to Giustozzi’s 2017 report for LandInfo, which was based primarily on interviews with Taliban sources. According to these sources, different networks within the Taliban have different surveillance assignments: the Haqqani network gathers information for special operations (large-scale attacks on high profiles), while the Peshawar Shura tracks wanted individuals. The Peshawar Shura is said to have around 500 spies and informers in Kabul. While the high profile attacks seem to take place largely in the city centre, the targeted killings, including the ones with magnetic IEDs, take place away from the city centre. Since 2016, the Taliban have started a campaign of targeted killings of government officials and ANSF members in Kandahar city”.  (page 63)

Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Afghanistan:

Whether the Taliban has the capacity to pursue individuals after they relocate to another region; their capacity to track individuals over the long term; Taliban capacity to carry out targeted killings (2012-January 2016), 15 February 2016, AFG105412.E,

Available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/56d7f2670.html

“…the Taliban may be able to find a person who relocates to a different area, and that they have been successful in doing so, particularly when targeting their "well known or well positioned opponents"

“… the Taliban generally has the capability to track individuals, through the use of "formal and informal communication" networks to obtain information about a person's whereabouts”

“…the Taliban has shadow governors and military commanders in almost all

provinces; communication and information-sharing between the command structure is likely, including in efforts to obtain information about a person's background”

“…whether the Taliban will seek information about someone can depend on the relationship between the commanders of the individual's province of origin and the destination province (ibid.). Similarly, the AAN analyst indicated that the strength of the local Taliban in the location where a person relocates to can be a factor in whether their background is detected; Taliban checkpoints and high levels of Taliban activity in an area increases the likelihood of searches of personal belongings and questioning of travelers”.

“… particularly in rural areas of Afghanistan, people are "extremely perceptive of their environments" and "know when a new person comes into the village or travels through it". Similarly, the AAN analyst stated that unless an outsider has a very good cover story, their background is likely to become known due to the close-knit nature of Afghan communities (AAN 20 Jan. 2016). The same source explained that factors impacting a person's ability to conceal their background include: tribal/local connections to elders and family, regional accent differences, last names which may refer to origin, religious affiliation and prayer rituals, and higher education profiles which may identify the individual as belonging to a higher social class (ibid.)”

Urban areas: "it is more difficult to track people [who] have moved into urban environments,

but even there the Taliban have spies and members who can gather considerable information" (13 Jan. 2016). The same source explained that tribal networks still operate in urban areas, and gave the example of the Taliban infiltrating and obtaining information from large refugee camps near Kabul (22 Jan. 2016). The analyst stated that the Taliban conducts local-level intelligence gathering in Kabul, and therefore have been able to carry out targeted attacks in some urban centres (AAN 20 Jan. 2016). A 2015 article by the Christian Science Monitor reports on one instance in which a Western journalist attended a large Pashtun wedding in

Kabul as a guest of one of the Afghan attendees; several days later the attendee and his family received threats and was accused of working as a spy for coalition forces (18 Nov. 2015).”

Tribal and family connections

“when people move from one location to another area where they have tribal or family connections, this could potentially shield the person's background from being uncovered; however, these same connections could also be their greatest liability in the sense that a person's connections could also be used as a way to locate the person (20 Jan. 2016). […] Afghans are a tribal people and this allows them to, in part, know the circumstances of people in their tribe or ethno-linguistic group. This is obviously easy to do at the local, district and Provincial level of their home locality but because of extended families and other dynamics, it [one's identity] is often hard to hide even when an Afghan leaves their home locality”.

“the Taliban "keep tabs" on people by exploiting tribal leaders' and families' knowledge of the whereabouts of their family members or tribe members (ibid.). Sources also report that the Taliban exerts pressure on family members of wanted individuals and that a targeted person's family may be punished in their absence […] in addition to exploiting tribal connections when pursuing a person of interest, the Taliban can apply pressure and draconian measures on the person's family members to gain information. This is probably their most important means in tracking down a person: "tell me where he/she is or we will kill your family." Such intimidation is usually a fairly successful tactic. (ibid.)”

“if the Taliban uncovers the background of an ordinary person, which the Taliban perceives to be questionable, this would create problems for that person (22 Jan. 2016). The AAN analyst explained that if the person in question is someone who has worked as an interpreter, for example, and relocates, if the Taliban becomes suspicious of that person's background, they might contact another district's commander to find out more about the individual (AAN 20 Jan. 2016). The AAN analyst gave the view that the concern for someone in a situation like that is about the possibility that their background would be found out in their new location […] The Professor stated that the Taliban's tribal networks are very well established and tribal law can cover long distances; people know what is occurring in their district

and that traditional ways of locating people through tribal networks still apply (22 Jan. 2016).”

“The AAN analyst explained that when an individual wanted by the Taliban relocates or returns to their province of origin and if their background is revealed, depending on the individual's profile, as well as the political climate of the day, that person could be killed, which has occurred (AAN 20 Jan. 2016)”.